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Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” 
program within metaethics.1 But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta-
normative questions? And if so, in what sense?2  
 
In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context 
of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in 
general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of 
constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to 
philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly 
understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the 
context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”. 
 
1. Contemporary Constitutivism 
 
In a moment, I’ll explore these claims in more detail. But before doing so, it will be useful to begin 
with a brief discussion of “constitutivism” as this term is used today. In what follows, I’ll use 
“constitutivism” to refer to the broad family of meta-normative views that endorse some version of 
the following: 
 
Core Constitutivist Claim: The fundamental norms that apply to X are explained by the 
nature of X. 
 
Crucially this definition of constitutivism is silent about two issues. First, it says very little about the 
sort of philosophical work this mode of “constitutivist explanation” is meant to accomplish. This is 
worth stressing here because “constitutivism” is often defined so that very dramatic claims about 
what constitutivism can accomplish are built into its definition. For example, one might define 
constitutivism as a program for answering, in a decisive fashion, what Korsgaard has dubbed “the 
normative question”.3 Or one might define constitutivism so that it is committed to closing the 
alleged gap between is and ought in some way.4 
 
These are some of the most prominent ways of motivating constitutivism. But it would be a mistake 
to treat such claims as part of the definition of what constitutivism is. For constitutivists disagree 
greatly about what exactly constitutivism can accomplish. And it is far from clear that the appeal of 
                                               
1 The association of Kant and constitutivism is due above all to the work of Korsgaard – see for example 
Korsgaard(1996, 2008, 2009). A close second in significance in this regard is Velleman(2000, 2009). For some of the 
other (Kantian and anti-Kantian) variants on the constitutivist idea, see Foot(2003), Thomson(2008), Thompson(2008), 
Smith(2012,2013), James(2012), Walden(2012), Katsafanas(2013), Setiya(2013), and Lavin(forthcoming). Say something 
about “constitutivism” in other areas? 
2 I’ve discussed this question previously (with more of a contemporary focus) in Schafer(2015-a,b, 2018-a). See also the 
discussion of Sensen(2013), which arrives at a somewhat similar conclusion, albeit in a different systematic context. 
3 Korsgaard herself is often read this way, although the precise sense in which this is true of her work is open to some 
dispute. 
4 Compare Lindeman(2017) 
 2 
constitutivism stands or falls with its ability to perform any particular metaethical task.5 Thus, in 
considering the merits of constitutivism, it is important to keep the mode of philosophical explanation 
which is essential to constitutivism separate from the philosophical work this style of explanation 
can accomplish. Of course, the constitutivist mode of explanation must do something to be of 
philosophical interest. But just what it can do should be left open by its definition. 
 
Given this, some of the most prominent objections to constitutivism are best understood – not as 
objections to constitutivism as such – but rather as objections to claims about what constitutivism 
can accomplish. This is particularly true of the “shmagency objection” made famous by Enoch’s 
discussion of Korsgaard.6 For even if we think that Enoch is right about what the possibility of 
shmagency shows, this is at most an objection to certain claims about constitutivism’s capacity to 
decisively foreclose normative questions. Thus, so long as we do not think the attractiveness of 
constitutivism depends upon its ability to perform this task, worries about “shmagency” need not be 
fatal to the constitutivist.7 
 
This is significant, because I think it is clear that Kant’s interest in broadly constitutivist ideas was 
not motivated by the use of these ideas that Enoch targets. For example, Kant certainly did not 
intend his account of the relationship between moral requirements and practical reason to provide 
us with a dialectically effective response to all forms of moral skepticism. For Kant’s official position 
is that our cognitive access to the nature of practical reason occurs via our consciousness of the 
moral law (as the fundamental principle of pure practical reason).8 Thus, according to Kant’s official 
account, it is our consciousness of the moral law that comes first in the order of cognition. As a 
result, if there are indeed constitutivist elements within Kant’s account, their purpose is not to, say, 
help us answer the question: “Why be moral?” 
 
This is one sense in which my definition of constitutivism is purposely broad. But there is a second 
issue on which this definition is intentionally silent – namely, the question of exactly which X’s this 
definition applies to. For example, my definition of constitutivism says nothing about which 
description of my nature it is which grounds the fundamental norms that apply to me.  
 
It is on this point that constitutivism breaks into a wide range of sub-genres. For example, 
Aristotelian constitutivists focus on my nature as a human being. While “Humean” constitutivists 
focus on my nature as a rational being in a some rather minimal sense of “rational”.  
 
Of these forms of constitutivism, our focus will be constitutivism in its Kantian form. Kantian 
constitutivism is often described as treating our nature as agents as what explains the fundamental 
norms that apply to us. For example, Kantian constitutivists are often thought of as grounding facts 
about normative reasons in facts about the nature of agency: 
                                               
5 For more modest conceptions of constitutivism’s role, see Schafer(2015-a, 2018-a), Smith(2012, 2013), Lord and 
Sylvan(forthcoming). 
6 For the canonical statement of the shmagency worry, see Enoch(2006, 2011). For further discussion, see Ferraro(2009), 
Tiffany(2012), and Silverstein(2015), amongst others. 
7 See Schafer(2015a,b). For a more involved defense of this point, see Paakkunainen(2018). That being said, the 
“shmagency point” might point to certain explanatory limitations of constitutivism – limitations that could have much 
broader significance for the constitutivist strategy. My aim here, of course, is not to settle these debates. 
8 Here I take the second Critique to provide Kant’s canonical statement of his views on this issue. I don’t believe this 
should be especially controversial. Unfortunately there’s no time here to discuss the relationship between the second 
Critique and the Groundwork, where Kant may flirt with aims more like those that Enoch targets. 
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Agency-First Constitutivism: The fundamental norms that apply to us are grounded in our 
nature as agents.9 
 
This remains the dominant way of formulating Kantian constitutivism. But, as I’ve argued 
elsewhere, such formulations obscure some of the important advantages of Kantian forms of 
contitutivism.10 For example, a focus on agency can suggest a view that is best suited to the practical, 
as opposed to the epistemic, domain. And so this focus can hinder the development of a truly 
unified account of both theoretical and practical norms along constitutivist lines. Similarly, it can 
easily make the Kantian view seem implausibly self-obsessed – concerned with the project of self-
unification or self-governance as opposed to the wider world. And it can also hide from our eyes 
some of the resources the Kantian has for explaining the normative significance of moral and 
epistemic principles. 
 
Of course, much more would need to be said about each of these points to make them compelling.11 
I note them here solely to give the reader a sense of why it seems to me that Kantian constitutivism 
is best characterized as treating as fundamental – not our nature as agents – but rather our nature as 
rational beings, or creatures endowed with the capacity of reason: 
 
Reason-First Constitutivism: The fundamental norms that apply to us are grounded in our 
nature as rational beings or creatures with the capacity of reason. 
 
In reading Reason-First Constitutivism, it is important to remember that the notion of reason at 
issue here (for the Kantian at least) is equally theoretical and practical. So it includes within its scope, 
our powers of practical reason and rational agency. In this sense, Reason-First Constitutivism is a 
natural development of Agency-First Constitutivism – one which aims to make explicit that the 
starting point of the Kantian account should be a unified conception of reason as both theoretical and 
practical.  
 
Indeed, as we will see, the most Kantian forms of Agency-First Constitutivism and Reason-First 
Constitutivism converge with one another, once fully developed. But nonetheless, I will focus on 
Reason-First Constitutivism here. This framing is particularly helpful in a historical context, since it 
fits better with Kant’s own discussion of these issues. In particular, as we will see, Kant’s 
constitutivism is best understood as an instance of a more general “capacity-first” approach to 
philosophy. And the capacity that is most fundamental, for Kant, in developing that approach is just 
the faculty of reason itself.  
 
As a result, what is truly most fundamental to Kant’s constitutivism is a certain conception of the 
faculty of reason. Now, to be fair, reason is for Kant the faculty for a particular form of agency. But 
if our aim is to understand Kant’s form of constitutivism, it is more accurate to describe it as a form 
of Reason-First Constitutivism as opposed to trying to translate Kant’s claims about reason into a 
corresponding form of Agency-First Constitutivism, even if there is a sense in which such a 
translation is possible. 
 
                                               
9 Again, this sort of view is most closely associated with the work of Korsgaard and Velleman. For related views, see 
Bagnoli(2011, 2013), James(2012), Smith(2012, 2013), and Kastafantsas(2013), amongst others. 
10 For more discussion of this point, see Schafer(2018-a, forthcoming-a). Compare Walden(forthcoming). 
11 For a fuller development of this view, see Schafer(2018-a, forthcoming-a,c) 
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2. The Foundational Role of Capacities within the Critical Philosophy 
 
With this bit of contemporary context in mind, let’s turn to the interpretative questions which will 
be this essay’s focus. As noted above, in doing so, I will begin somewhere rather non-obvious, given 
our topic. In particular, I want to start – not by discussing Kant’s explicit discussion of broadly 
meta-normative questions – but rather with some more general questions concerning Kant’s 
philosophical methodology during the critical period. 
 
To understand why these more general questions are relevant, it will be helpful to begin with Kant’s 
conception of the shape philosophy must take if it is to be rationally satisfactory. As is familiar, one 
of reason’s fundamental demands, according to Kant, is for “systematic unity”. Speaking very 
roughly, this means that reason will only be satisfied with a body of cognitions insofar as they form 
an organized unity as opposed to a “mere aggregate”: 
 
... systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into a science, i.e., makes a 
system out of a mere aggregate of it ... (A832/8860) 
 
What gives cognitions this sort of unity is the fact that they are grounded in more fundamental 
principles or ideas, which provide them with systematic structure. Just what this requires is a 
complicated question, which I cannot discuss in detail here.12 But one important implication of these 
ideas is that philosophy will only be rationally satisfactory insofar as it forms a unified system of 
judgments or cognitions, which must be based on certain a priori principles or ideas. Thus, for Kant, 
philosophy is only possible insofar as we can locate principles or ideas that can play this 
foundational, unifying role – not just with respect to this or that particular area of inquiry, but also 
with respect to all of philosophy or, indeed, human cognition in general: 
 
Philosophy in sensu scholastico involves two things, (1.) A sufficient supply of cognitions of 
reason. (2.) A correct connection of these, or a system. For a system is the connection of 
many cognitions in accordance with an idea. (24:799) 
 
The two must be united; for without cognitions one will never become a philosopher, but 
cognitions alone will never constitute the philosopher either, unless there is in addition a 
purposive combination of all cognitions and skills in a unity, and an insight into their 
agreement with the highest ends of human reason. (9:25) 
 
But where is philosophy to find these unifying principles or ideas? Kant’s answer to this question is 
heavily constrained by another of his fundamental methodological commitments during the critical 
period. In particular, partially in the wake of his struggle to explain the possibility of synthetic a 
priori principles, Kant become convinced that human insight bottoms out in a set of basic faculties 
– faculties which cannot be explained in more fundamental terms, but which nonetheless provide a 
non-arbitrary basis for further explanations: 
 
But all human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at basic powers or basic faculties; for 
there is nothing through which their possibility can be conceived, and yet it may not be invented and assumed at 
one’s discretion.  (5:46-7, my emphasis) 
                                               
12 I discuss this further in Schafer(forthcoming-d). For some related discussion of these issues, see Ameriks(2011), 
Guyer(2008), Wood(1999), Grier(2005), Watkins(2018), and Willashek(forthcoming). 
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We’ll return in a moment to why Kant believes that our basic rational capacities – and only those – 
are capable of playing this role. But for now, I want to focus on its implications both for the order of 
human cognition (the ratio cognoscendi of things) and for the order of metaphysical explanation (their 
ratio essendi). 
 
On the one hand, Kant is claiming here that, at least within the limits of human cognition, our ability 
to have insight into the metaphysical explanation of things (their ratio essendi) comes to an end with 
the nature of certain basic rational faculties. Thus, at least for us, the nature of these faculties takes 
priority in the order of metaphysical explanation. In other words, for us, philosophical explanations 
bottom out in the nature of these capacities. 
 
But these basic rational capacities, in virtue of their self-conscious character, also provide human 
cognition with a set of cognitive fixed points – that is, with something that may not invented in an 
arbitrary or discretionary fashion. Thus, the self-consciousness of these basic faculties – or, more 
precisely, the self-conscious character of their activities – provides us with something that takes 
priority in the order of cognition (ratio cognoscendi) as well. In a moment, we’ll discuss how Kant 
conceives of this more fully. But the important point at present is just that these capacities (as self-
conscious) also serve, according to Kant, as something that is cognitively or epistemically 
fundamental for us. 
 
Given all this, it is not hard to guess where Kant will locate the fundamental principles that 
systematic philosophy requires. In particular, at least for the critical Kant, these principles must 
located in our basic rational faculties. Thus, it is no surprise to discover that, at least during the 
critical period, Kant consistently maintains that the foundations of a genuine philosophical system or 
science can only be provided by the fundamental faculties of the mind and the principles that govern 
these faculties: 
 
In this way the a priori principles of two faculties of the mind, the faculty of cognition and that 
of desire, would be found and determined as to the conditions, extent, and boundaries of their 
use, and a firm basis would thereby be laid for a scientific system of philosophy, both theoretical and practical. 
(5:12, my emphasis, compare 5:169) 
 
The concepts of nature, which contain the ground for all theoretical cognition a priori, rested 
on the legislation of the understanding.  ... The concept of freedom, which contains the 
ground for all sensibly unconditioned practical precepts a priori, rested on the legislation of 
reason. (5:176) 
 
As we’ll discuss more fully, this mode of explanation is possible for Kant because these basic 
rational capacities do in fact provide us with just the sort of principle that is required here. Given 
this, one of the main tasks of the “critique” of our rational faculties is to identify the principles that 
are characteristic of their activities. In other words, as Kant puts it, “critical philosophy” must 
deliver to “doctrinal philosophy” the principles that will serve as doctrinal philosophy’s foundation. 
For example, the critique of practical reason both provides us with clear consciousness of the 
principles of pure practical reason and their limits, and delivers these principles to moral philosophy 
to serve as the foundation for a systematic understanding of moral “doctrine”. 
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In this way, while the project of critique is often thought of in terms of the negative task of 
determining the proper limits of our rational faculties, critique also has a crucial positive task as well – 
namely, to identify the principles that will serve as the foundation for “doctrinal” philosophy, by 
tracing them to their roots in our rational faculties: 
 
The critique of the faculties of cognition with regard to what they can accomplish a priori has, 
strictly speaking, no domain with regard to objects, because it is not a doctrine, but only has to 
investigate whether and how a doctrine is possible through it given the way it is situated with 
respect to our faculties. (5:176, compare 20:195, 20:202)  
 
There’s much more to be said about these ideas, but the most important points for present purposes 
are the following. First, philosophy for Kant can be systematic only insofar as it is grounded in a 
unified system of non-arbitrary principles. Second, for Kant, these principles can only be provided 
by our basic rational capacities. And, third, as a result, a truly systematic philosophy is possible only 
insofar as our rational faculties themselves form a systematic unity:  
 
There is thus revealed a system of the powers of mind, in their relation to nature and freedom, both 
of which have their own special, determining principles a priori and therefore constitute the two parts of 
philosophy (the theoretical and the practical) as a doctrinal system ... (20:247, my emphasis, compare 
5:169) 
 
Now, in saying all this, it is important to stress that for Kant (unlike for many of the German 
Idealists who followed him) to say that our rational faculties form a system is not to say that these 
faculties are reducible to some single common explanatory principle. Rather, Kant stresses that there 
are limits to this sort of reduction (at least from a human perspective): 
 
... all faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to the three that cannot be further 
derived from a common ground: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure, and the faculty of desire. (5:177) 
 
Thus, although Kant is deeply committed to a system of our rational faculties, he just as deeply rejects 
the project of reducing this system to a single ur-faculty or -principle.13  The question of the 
compatibility of these two ideas will, of course, be the focus of a good deal of German philosophy 
in the decades after Kant. But for our purposes here, it is sufficient to keep these two commitments 
in mind. 
 
3. Which Faculties? Transcendental Arguments and Self-Consciousness 
 
Of course, this sort of “capacities-first” approach to philosophy invites many questions. For 
example, how are we to determine which faculties are to have this sort of foundational status? And 
how, in particular, can we do so in a non-arbitrary and rationally satisfying fashion? 
 
In the literature on Kant, and indeed in Kant himself, one can find at least two basic strategies for 
responding to these questions. First, as I have already suggested, it might be that we are entitled to 
take certain rational faculties for granted in our philosophical theorizing in virtue of the self-conscious 
                                               
13 Thus, in some ways, Kant is here closer to Hegel’s holistic picture of the interdependence of the elements of a system 
than he is to Reinhold or Fichte’s emphasis on locating some absolute first principle. 
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character of those very faculties. Or, second, it might be that the introduction of these faculties into 
our philosophical system is justified via some sort of transcendental argument, which shows them to be 
necessary conditions on even more basic features of experience.  
 
It is hard to deny that both of these strategies have a role to play in Kant’s overall philosophical 
methodology. But nonetheless it seems to me that it is the first that provides the ultimate 
foundations for the critical philosophy. To see why, it will be helpful to consider one of the best 
recent statements of how the other interpretative option here might go. The discussion I have in 
mind appears in Haag(2014). There Haag writes: 
 
The existence of faculties, from the perspective of transcendental philosophy, likewise has to 
be established by reflecting on the conditions of the possibility of conscious experience. ...  it 
is the function that transcendental reflection reveals as needing to be fulfilled that justifies the 
introduction of a particular faculty. (199) 
 
In other words, for Haag, the introduction of any faculty – even the most basic – into our 
philosophical system must, for Kant, be justified by some further piece of “transcendental 
reflection”. 
 
I think Haag is perfectly correct in claiming that something like this strategy is used at times by 
Kant. But I doubt that this accurately characterize how Kant views our entitlement to appeal to the 
existence of certain very basic rational faculties. The reason for this is quite simple. For suppose we 
ask Haag how he understands the starting point of the sort of “transcendental reflections” which 
(according to him) justifies the introduction of any faculty into the critical system.  
 
In answering this question we must, of course, remember that the starting point of these reflections 
is not, for Kant, an extremely minimal sort of self-consciousness. Rather, unlike (say) Reinhold or 
Fichte, Kant begins his “transcendental reflections” in all three Critiques with something more 
robust. For example, the starting point of Kant’s “transcendental reflections” in the first Critique is 
not the bare fact of self-consciousness, but rather the fact that we are creatures who are capable (at 
least in principle) of empirical cognition of a fairly non-trivial sort. And plainly something similar is true 
of the both the second and third Critiques as well. 
 
Given this, it is only fair to ask Haag how we are to know that we are creatures with the capacity for 
these sorts of non-trivial cognitive achievements. For example, how can we know that we are capable 
(at least in principle) of empirical cognition in the sense the first Critique takes for granted? Not, at 
least for Kant, through a further, more basic piece of “transcendental reflection” of the sort Haag 
describes. Rather, for Kant, it seems clear that we can know that we are creatures with a capacity for 
(say) empirical cognition simply in virtue of the self-conscious character of our basic cognitive 
capacities.  
 
In this way, at least in the context of Kant’s views, there does not seem to be any real alternative to 
the idea that the existence of some basic rational faculties can be established in virtue of their self-
conscious character. As we’ll discuss in the next section, this means that the foundations of 
philosophy are, for Kant, provided by the kind of active self-consciousness we possess as creatures with 
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these basic rational capacities.14 That is, transcendental philosophy ultimately begins with that 
consciousness of their own activities which is constitutive of these capacities as self-conscious. 
Then, from this starting point, the critical philosopher can make this consciousness more explicit, 
and then proceed to use this explicit consciousness as a foundation for further philosophical 
theorizing. But the ultimate foundations of the critical philosophy are provided by this 
consciousness of the activities of our own rational faculties. Thus, as Kant says about these 
foundations: 
 
Nothing here can escape us, because what reason brings forth entirely out of itself cannot be 
hidden, but is brought to light by reason itself as soon as reason’s common principle has been 
discovered. (Axx, compare 28:1051)  
 
4. Two Brief Illustrations: Transcendental Idealism and the Fact of Reason 
 
This way of thinking about Kant’s basic methodological commitments is, I think, quite helpful for 
thinking about many of the most vexed issues in Kant interpretation. For once one recognizes that 
Kant is working within this “capacities-first” framework, it is easy to find it in action throughout his 
critical works.  
 
For example, from this perspective, we can approach the familiar issue of Kant’s Transcendental 
Idealism from a more systematic perspective, by seeing it as one (particularly important, to be sure) 
application of this “capacities-first” mode of philosophical explanation. After all, the whole point of 
Transcendental Idealism is precisely to explain the (formal) nature of spatial-temporal reality by 
grounding this reality in the formal features of our faculties for empirical cognition.  
 
Of course, just what this mode of explanation involves – especially from a metaphysical perspective 
– has been the subject of endless debate. My own view, in brief, is that while Transcendental 
Idealism does commit Kant to the existence of some sort of metaphysical dependence of the form 
of the sensible world on the form of our cognitive faculties, the precise nature of this dependence 
relation is left highly indeterminate by Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Thus, on my reading, it is only 
with the practical philosophy that we begin to see anything like a developed account of how the 
sensible world depends upon our rational faculties.  
 
In any case, the topic of this essay is not Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. So the important point for 
present purposes is simply that Transcendental Idealism provides us with a central example of the 
capacities-first approach to philosophy in action. And this aspect of Kant’s philosophical 
methodology is also clearly on display at the foundations of Kant’s practical philosophy as well. 
Consider, for example, Kant’s discussion of the famous (or infamous) Faktum der Vernunft.  
 
This section of the second Critique has often been regarded as an unhappy retreat by Kant into a pre-
critical form of moral dogmatism. But when read correctly, Kant’s appeal in it to a basic 
consciousness of the moral law appears in a very different light. In particular, far from being a 
retreat into some sort of rational intuitionism, the Faktum der Vernunft is best understood precisely as 
                                               
14 Note that this means that to say that philosophy rests on our capacity for reason is not to say that it rests on the mere 
concept of this capacity – which, on its own, is inadequate (for Kant) to play the role required here. (6:26) For more on the 
ability of this sort of consciousness to provide us with something like cognition of our own freedom, see Schafer(2018-
b). 
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an instance of the capacity-first approach to philosophy – an approach to philosophy which is 
central (for Kant) to the difference between transcendental philosophy and dogmatic rationalism. 
 
Indeed, the Faktum der Vernunft is especially interesting here because it clearly displays the priority of 
our basic rational faculties in both the order of cognition and the order of metaphysical explanation. 
On the one hand, in the Faktum der Vernunft, Kant treats our consciousness of freedom as based in 
the self-consciousness of pure practical reason itself – a self-consciousness that involves a 
consciousness of the moral law as the principle of practical reason. So, in this sense, the order of 
cognition in work in this passage begins with the self-consciousness of practical reason, just as we 
would have expected from our discussion. 
 
But, at the same time, Kant also treats the nature of practical reason as fundamental with respect to 
the order of philosophical explanation here as well. For, in claiming that autonomy is the ratio essendi 
of morality, Kant claims that it is the nature of practical reason – and, in particular, its character as 
autonomous – which explains why we are subject to the moral law in the first place. So here 
different aspects of practical reason as a faculty take (first) cognitive and (second) metaphysical 
priority within the contours of Kant’s account. 
 
5. Principles: How Rational Capacities Make Philosophy Possible 
 
If all this is correct, then the viability of Kant’s philosophical project depends, at a very fundamental 
level, on the ability of our basic rational capacities to play the role we have been describing. To do 
so, at least two things must be true of them. First, they must provide us with principles that can play 
a foundational explanatory role within philosophy. And, second, these principles must (at least under 
advantageous conditions) be accessible to us in virtue of the fact that we are rational creatures who 
possess the relevant rational capacities. 
 
One source of support for the present interpretation is that Kant’s conception of rational faculties 
is, indeed, perfectly suited to play these two roles. In fact, as we will see, these roles are closely 
connected for Kant – since the self-conscious character of our faculties is, according to Kant, closely 
linked to the sense in which their activities are governed by principles of a non-trivial sort.  
 
To explore this, let’s begin by considering Kant’s conception of a rational faculty in more detail. As 
Kant understands them, capacities are individuated by principles which (in a manner that will 
become clear) both describe and govern their activity. For present purposes, these principles can be 
thought of as characterizing the activity that is distinctive of the faculty in question. The principle of 
a faculty, in other words, tells us what this faculty (as such) does – be this synthesis or judgment or 
inference or the determination of the will or the formation of new concepts.15 
 
As this indicates, there is at least a weak sense in which every genuine faculty is “active” for Kant. 
For the activity of any genuine faculty is governed by an internal principle which characterizes its 
distinctive forms of activity. Of course, just how robust this “activity” is – and, in particular, whether 
it is conditional on something external to the faculty – will vary from faculty to faculty. So, for 
example, the “activity” of sensibility as a faculty will be conditional, in different ways, on both the 
affection of the subject by the object and the higher ends and activities of the understanding, 
                                               
15 Compare Reath(2006,2013) and Herman(1993,2007) on the “power-conferring” or “power-constituting” character of 
principles in Kant.  
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judgment, and (ultimately) reason. But nonetheless, sensibility still does possess an internal principle 
in this very general sense. 
 
In this way, for Kant, every faculty is paired with an internal principle that explains how this faculty 
functions insofar as it is free from abnormal, external “hindrances”. As we will see, this idea is very 
significant for Kant’s understanding of the “sources of normativity”. But before considering this 
connection, we need to discuss how these internal principles play the two roles required by the 
capacities-first approach to philosophy sketched above. 
 
In order to play the first of these roles, these principles must be robust enough to serve as the 
explanatory foundations for both theoretical and practical philosophy. But, to play the second, they 
must also be something we can have access to simply in virtue of possessing the self-conscious 
capacities they govern. Unfortunately, at least at first glance, these roles seem to push us in opposite 
directions. After all, the more robust these principles are, the less plausible it is that an awareness of 
them is somehow “implicit” in the possession of the relevant rational capacities. So, it is only fair to 
wonder whether it is possible to combine these two roles in the manner Kant’s methodology seems 
to require. 
 
Giving a fully satisfactory response to this concern would be a book-length project. So I cannot 
pretend to present such a response here.16 But I do want to say a bit more about these issues, before 
moving on, to give the reader some sense of how Kant’s conception of rational capacities is designed 
to deal with them.17 
 
In doing so, I’ll focus on the element of Kant’s conception of our capacities that is most 
immediately relevant to the topic of this essay – namely, its teleological dimension. This dimension is 
clear from Kant’s consistent use of teleological terms to describe our faculties. For example: 
 
The final aim to which in the end the speculation of reason in its transcendental use is directed 
concerns three objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence 
of God. (A798/B826, my emphasis, in a section entitled “On the ultimate end of the pure use 
of our reason”) 
 
... the lawful unity in a combination that we cognize as in accordance with a necessary aim (a 
need) of the understanding ... (5:184, my emphasis) 
 
... the understanding, which is aimed at an end that is necessary for it, namely to introduce into 
it unity of principles ... (5:187, my emphasis) 
 
Similarly, Kant often uses the closely related notion of an “interest” to characterize our faculties: 
 
To every faculty of the mind one can attribute an interest, that is a principle that contains the 
condition under which alone its exercise is promoted. ... That which is required for the 
                                               
16 But see Schafer(forthcoming-d) 
17 Given these limitations, I’ll mostly be leaving the hylomorphic dimension of Kant’s conception of our faculties to the 
side here, although this is absolutely central to the explanatory project once it is fully developed. Compare e.g. 
Willashek(forthcoming). For an insightful development of these aspects of Kant in the context of contemporary 
epistemology, see Kern(2018). 
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possibility of any use of reason as such, namely, that its principles and affirmations must not 
contradict one another, constitutes no part of its interest but is instead the condition of having 
reason at all; only its extension, not mere consistency with itself, is reckoned as its interest. 
(5:120) 
 
Reason is driven by a propensity of its nature to go beyond its use in experience, to venture 
to the outermost bounds of all cognition by means of mere ideas in a pure use, and to find 
peace only in the completion of its circle in a self-subsisting systematic whole. Now is this 
striving grounded merely in its speculative interest, or rather uniquely and solely in its practical interest? 
(A797/B825, my emphasis) 
 
Given such passages, there is little doubt that Kant’s conception of our faculties is teleological in 
some sense. But how exactly should these teleological characterizations be understood? 
 
Well, Kant’s official definition of an “end” is the following: “the concept of an object insofar as it at 
the same time contains the ground of the reality of this object.” (5:180, compare 4:427, 6:381)  So, 
by the lights of this definition, to attribute an end X to something seems to involve regarding that 
thing as related to some representation of X, a representation which functions as the ground of the 
existence of X. In other words, to represent our rational capacities as having ends seems, for Kant, 
to involve representing the activities of these faculties as governed by a representation of the 
faculty’s end in some sense.18 
 
Moreover, unlike in the case of artifacts, it seems clear that the end in question is sometimes internal 
to the faculty in question here.19 And, unlike in the case of natural organisms, in making such claims 
about our faculties, Kant does not seem to be doing so merely for “regulative” purposes by means 
of an “analogy”.20 Rather, it seems clear that Kant means to attribute ends to our faculties in a 
stronger, less analogical sense.21 
 
So how should we think about Kant’s attribution of teleological structure to our faculties? It is 
helpful here, I think, to understand our faculties as having a teleological structure that is formally 
akin to the teleological structure of natural organisms, only without the restrictions that Kant places 
                                               
18 Here there are interesting connections with the contemporary literature on the “taking condition”. See 
Boghossian(2008,2014). Unfortunately I can’t explore these connections in more detail here, but see Neta(forthcoming) 
a contemporary view that share some features with the view I’ll be attributing to Kant. 
19 This is clearly true of reason in particular. Whether the ends of other rational faculties – such as the understanding – 
are internal to those faculties is a complicated question, since these ends do in some sense depend on reason’s ends. 
20 See 5:360. Compare: 
 
Nevertheless, teleological judging is rightly drawn into our research into nature, at least problematically, but only in 
order to bring it under principles of observation and research in analogy with causality according to ends, without presuming thereby to 
explain it. It thus belongs to the reflecting, not to the determining power of judgment. ... If, however, we were to 
base nature on intentionally acting causes, hence were to ground teleology not merely on a regulative principle for 
the mere judging of appearances, ... it would introduce a new causality into natural science, which, however, we merely borrow 
from ourselves and ascribe to other beings, yet without wanting to think of them as similar to ourselves. (5:360-1, my emphasis, 
compare 5:375) 
 
21 For discussion, see (e.g.) Guyer(2008), Ginsborg(2015), and Breitenbach(2014) (amongst others). I am most 
sympathetic to Breitenbach’s treatment of these issues, which focuses on the analogy between natural teleological 
systems and the teleology of practical reason. 
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on our use of teleological concepts in the biological case.22 In other words, for Kant, our faculties 
seem to have the formal structure that natural organisms would have if we were entitled to think of 
such organisms using our teleological concepts in a more than merely analogical fashion.23 
 
What this means is that, like natural organisms, our faculties must be thought of as self-organizing 
wholes.24 But, unlike in the biological case, a faculty’s activities are literally guided by an end which is 
internal to that very faculty. So how are we to make sense of this, without committing Kant to an 
implausibly intellectualized conception of our rational capacities? 
 
At this stage, it is helpful to return to one of the passages cited above, in order to note something 
puzzling about it: 
 
To every faculty of the mind one can attribute an interest, that is a principle that contains the 
condition under which alone its exercise is promoted. ... (5:120, my emphasis) 
 
Here Kant identifies the interest of a faculty with the “condition under which alone its exercise is 
promoted”. This should strike many contemporary readers as rather odd. But for someone, like 
Kant, steeped in the broadly Aristotelian context of post-Leibnizian German philosophy, it would 
have in fact seemed quite natural. For part of a broadly Aristotelian conception of our capacities is 
the idea that a genuine capacity must, in a sense, aim at its own exercise or activity.25 
 
On this conception, any faculty can be thought of as having the “end” of actualizing itself via its 
own characteristic activity.26 In other words, as Reath nicely puts the point, any such “capacity is 
constitutively aimed at its own proper exercise”.27 If this is right, then to say that a faculty represents 
its own end is just to say that it represents its own characteristic activity and that this representation ideally 
guides that activity. So, to say that a faculty represents its own end is just to say that it has an active 
or productive consciousness of its own activity. In this sense, as noted above, the teleological 
character of our rational faculties for Kant is fundamentally a product of the manner in which they 
are self-conscious. 
 
Is such a conception of our rational capacities overly-intellectualized? Answering this question lies 
outside the scope of this essay. But it is worth stressing here that, in attributing an active 
representation of its own activity to each rational faculty, we are not saying that we are normally 
explicitly conscious of this representation.28 Rather, as Kant notes, “For common cognition it is not 
necessary that we be conscious of these rules and reflect on them.” (24:27, compare A78/B103) 
                                               
22 Compare the very helpful discussion in Fugate(2014). 
23 See, again, Breitenbach(2014)’s discussion of these issues. Here it is important to stress that it is of course true that 
there are real limits, according to Kant, to our ability to achieve anything like genuine cognition (Erkenntnis) of the 
teleological structure of our faculties through the use of these concepts. For further discussion, see Schafer(2018-b). 
24 This brings us back to the hylomorphic characterization of these faculties we set aside above. As Kant stresses, to be 
self-organizing whole something must possess a “a self-propagating formative power” – a power to bring form to itself. 
(5:374) 
25 For discussion of this idea, see Herman(2007), Reath(2013), and especially Engstrom(2009). Compare Rödl(2018). 
26 This point has its sensible manifestation in Kant’s discussion of judgments of beauty within the third Critique – and, in 
particular, in that discussion’s claim that we take pleasure in the free-play of our basic rational faculties. Such pleasure, I 
believe, is best understood as the sensible manifestation of the interest that any faculty must have in its own actualization 
or exercise. 
27 Reath(2013), 577. 
28 Compare Cohen(2009), Longuenesse(2017). 
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In addition, we need not understand the idea of each faculty as possessing a representation of its 
own activity to imply that this representation is something over and above the activities of the faculty. 
Rather, this “representation” may be implicit in or constitutive of these very activities themselves in 
some way.29 In other words, while it is clear that a rational faculty must, for Kant, possess a guiding 
consciousness of its own characteristic activity, this awareness need not involve a distinct 
representation over and above its activities.  
 
6. Kant’s Constitutivism: How Rational Faculties Ground Norms 
 
Unfortunately, pursuing these questions further would lead us away from this essay’s topic. So I 
want to turn back now to Kant relationship to constitutivism – and how this relates to the broader 
theme of Kant as a capacities-first philosopher. 
 
To consider these questions, let’s turn (at last) to Kant’s explicit account of the nature of normative 
propositions or imperatives. This account is well represented by passages like the following:  
 
A practical rule is always a product of reason because it prescribes action as a means to an 
effect, which is its purpose. But for a being in whom reason quite alone is not the determining 
ground of the will, this rule is an imperative, that is, a rule indicated by an ‘ought’, which … signifies 
that if reason completely determined the will the action would without fail take place in accordance with this 
rule.” (5:20, my emphasis, compare 4:449)  
 
As this make clear, imperatives for Kant apply only to beings who possess reason, but in whom this 
faculty’s proper operation may be hindered by the external influence of sensibility. More precisely, 
for Kant, an imperative applies to some agent just in case it accurately characterizes what they would 
do if their rational faculties were free of any such “external hinderance”.30 
 
For example, the moral law can be thought of in at least two ways. First, it may be thought of as a 
principle which describes how practical reason functions insofar as it is free of any illicit sensible 
influence.31 In this sense, it is “descriptive” or “constitutive” of practical reason – although, of 
course, what it is describing is a teleologically-structured faculty. But, with respect to creatures in 
whom reason can be interfered with by sensibility, the moral law may also be represented as an 
imperative – namely the categorical imperative in its various formulations.32 Thus, when we consider 
reason in the context of a sensibly conditioned finite subject, the principle of reason as a faculty will 
                                               
29 See Boyle(2009), Burge(2010), and Longuenesse(2017). 
30 Compare Marshall(forthcoming). 
31 As Kant stresses in the Religion, exactly how this sort of “hinderance” occurs is (at least in some cases) “inscrutable” 
for us – given that it must leave evil actions imputable to us and so traceable to our spontaneous power of choice. (6:21) 
Here, as in many places, we come up against the limits of our comprehension of the relationship between our sensible 
and intellectual faculties. Given this, it is important to see Kant’s evolving views concerning the relationship between 
practical reason, the will, and the power of choice as making room for this “inscrutability” as opposed to explaining what 
remains (for Kant) inscrutable. And, even in the Religion, Kant continues to stress that deviations from the moral law (i) 
are not internal to practical reason and (ii) are only possible insofar as our sensible nature provides the power of choice 
with an incentive that can conflict with the incentive of the moral law. 
32 Compare 5:403-4. 
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always be both constitutive (of reason’s exercise insofar as this is free of illicit sensible influences) and 
normative (for the subject’s thoughts and actions given that they are subject to such influences).33   
 
Crucially, this point generalizes to any rational faculty whatsoever. In other words, in this sense, 
imperatival principles are equally characteristic of both theoretical and practical faculties. For the 
principle characteristic of any (human) rational faculty – be it theoretical or practical – can be 
expressed as either a theoretical claim about how this faculty functions (when “left to its own 
devices”) or a normative claim about how it ought to function in rationally imperfect creatures like 
ourselves. 
 
For example, Kant similarly stresses that errors of the understanding are always the product, not of the 
understanding itself, but rather of the “unnoticed influence of sensibility” upon us.34 Thus, much 
like the moral law, the principles of the understanding can be regarded either as characterizing how 
the understanding operates insofar as it is free of the “unnoticed influence of sensibility” or as 
imperatives which characterize how the understanding ought to function in creatures in whom such 
interference is possible.35  
 
Thus, we can now see that a very general sort of meta-normative constitutivism follows from Kant’s 
conception of our rational capacities, when it is paired with his account of imperatives or normative 
claims. For, given these commitments, the normative principles that apply to the activities of any 
rational faculty will, for Kant, be grounded in that faculty’s nature – and in particular the nature of 
its characteristic activity. Or, more precisely, the principles in question will be grounded in the nature 
of the relevant rational capacity – while the status of these principles as normative (as opposed to 
merely descriptive) will be grounded in the fact that this rational capacity is not free of external 
hinderance. 
 
In this way, Kant is indeed deeply committed to a form of constitutivism, which we might 
characterize as follows: 
 
Rational Capacities Constitutivism: The normative principles that apply to the activities of 
any rational capacity are grounded in the nature of that capacity. 
 
This principle is quite similar to Reason-First Constitutivism, but it does differ from that principle 
insofar as it treats as fundamental all of our rational faculties, as opposed to focusing on reason in 
particular. But remember that our rational capacities must themselves form a system for Kant. And 
this system must be a teleological one. That is, any system of rational capacities must also be a 
system of the ends of these capacities. And in any such system, it is plain that ends of reason in 
particular must take precedence for Kant. For reason is of course autonomous for Kant – so it’s 
                                               
33 In his insightful (if somewhat Sellarsian) discussion, Pollok(2017) also claims that such principles are both constitutive 
and normative, but he does not explain this in the manner I do here. This leads him to fail to recognize that this basic 
framework applies to the principles of logic (again, insofar as they are realized by a finite, sensibly conditioned subject). 
The ultimate source of these difficulties seems to me to be Pollok’s unease with the more metaphysical dimensions of 
Kant’s views. This resolutely non-metaphysical reading was, of course, dominant for much the 20th century, but one of 
the main advances of the last few decades of Kant scholarship seems to me to have been a recognition of the ways in 
which it misses some of what mattered most to Kant. 
34 A294/B350-1. 
35 Compare McDowell(2006), Engstrom(2009) and Kern(2018). As I discuss in Schafer(forthcoming-d), this has 
important implications for the extensive debate about whether logic is normative for Kant. 
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ends cannot be conditioned by the ends of any other faculty. Thus, if our faculties are to form a 
rational system, it must be reason’s ends in particular that serve as the foundation of this system’s 
teleological unity. 
 
For this reason, it can only be reason that ultimately determines the proper scope of the activities of 
all of our rational faculties. Or, in other words, it is the ends of reason that form the foundation for 
the system of our rational faculties.36 Thus, in the end, Kant is indeed best read – not just as a 
proponent of Rational Capacities Constitutivism – but also as a proponent of Reason-First 
Constitutivism.37 For it is ultimately reason, and its characteristic activities or ends, which, for Kant, 
determine the norms which govern the proper operation of all our various rational faculties: 
 
Reason-First Constitutivism: The most fundamental norms that apply to us are grounded in 
our nature as rational beings or creatures with the capacity of reason. 
 
7. Kant’s Constitutivism and the Unity of Reason 
 
Of course, Reason-First Constitutivism leaves the nature of the capacity of reason entirely open, and 
so, on its own, tells us very little about the norms which follow from this approach. As a result, in 
order to understand the implications of Kant’s commitment to this form of constitutivism, we 
would need to say much more about the ends and activities that are characteristic of reason as a 
capacity for Kant. 
 
Unfortunately, Kant describes reason’s characteristic activities in a variety of ways – including 
descriptions of reason: (i) as the faculty for (mediate) inference, (ii) as the faculty of principles, (iii) as the 
faculty for systematic unity, (iv) as autonomous, and (v) as faculty for what Kant calls comprehension. So, 
from an interpretative perspective, this question is anything but simple. As a result, I won’t pretend 
to offer anything like a comprehensive answer to them here.38 But I do want to say a bit more about 
this – both to put a little meat on the bones of the reading of Kant we have been developing and 
because doing so will help to clarify the relationship between Kantian forms of Reason-First 
Constitutivism and Agency-First Constitutivism. 
 
With these aims in mind, I’m going to focus here on three of Kant’s characterizations of reason in 
particular: 
 
 (i) Reason’s proper activity lies in (theoretical and practical) cognition from principles. 
 (ii) Reason’s proper activity lies in (theoretical and practical) comprehension. 
 (iii) Reason’s proper activity lies in autonomy. 
 
Let’s begin with the first of these claims. To understand what it implies, we need to remember that 
(in the sense relevant here) “cognition” (Erkenntnis) comes for Kant in both a theoretical and a 
practical form.39 In this sense of these terms, theoretical cognition is cognition of what is – cognition 
which (at least canonically) depends in some way on the existence of the object it represents. 
                                               
36 See 5:119-120. 
37 Compare Ameriks(2003, 2011), Reath(2006, 2013), Sensen(2013), Pollok(2017). 
38 But see Schafer(forthcoming-d) 
39 For more on my understanding of Kant’s conception of cognition, see Schafer(2018-b, forthcoming-b), for other 
important work on this topic, see Smit(2000), Willashek and Watkins(2018), and Tolley(manuscript). 
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Practical cognition, on the other hand, is characterized by Kant as cognition of what ought to be.40  
As such, as Kant understands it, it is a form of cognition which (canonically) relates to its object by 
being the ground of that object’s existence.41 
 
It is crucial to keep both of these forms of cognition in mind when reading the first of these 
characterizations. Otherwise, we might miss that Kant’s characterization of reason as the faculty for 
“cognition from principles” applies equally to both theoretical and practical reason. In other words, 
for Kant both theoretical reason and practical reason aim at this sort of principled cognition. The 
only difference between them lies in the sort of “cognition from principles” they aim at – and, in 
particular, in the manner in which this cognition relates to its object. 
 
So, in this broad sense of “cognition”, reason for Kant is “cognitive” in both its theoretical and its 
practical manifestations.42 But this, of course, does not distinguish reason from our other cognitive 
faculties. What is distinctive of reason, on this characterization, is its concern for cognition from 
principles in particular. What this means is a complicated question, but the fundamental idea here is 
simple enough. One has cognition from principles, in the sense relevant here, just insofar as one’s 
cognitions are grounded in even more fundamental and more general cognitions. So, for example, 
one has theoretical cognition from principles insofar as one’s cognition of what is is grounded in 
cognition of other, more basic features of reality. It is the search for this sort of systematic or 
principled cognition that is distinctive of reason in particular for Kant, on this characterization of 
reason. 
 
Given this, cognition from principles involves a grasp, not just of which properties something has 
(or ought to have), but also of how these ground one another. In other words, cognition from principles 
goes beyond mere cognition (Erkenntnis) to encompass what Kant calls comprehension (Begreifen). 
For comprehension in Kant’s sense differs from mere cognition precisely insofar as it involves a 
grasp of these sorts of explanatory relations. Thus, comprehension in Kant’s sense involves 
something like the sort of cognitive achievement which contemporary epistemologists like to call 
“understanding”. 
 
This brings us to the second of our characterizations of reason’s function – namely, the idea of 
reason as the faculty for comprehension – or, to put things in more contemporary jargon, reason as 
the faculty for understanding. Once again, it is crucial that comprehension or understanding in this 
sense may be either theoretical – an understanding of what is – or practical – an understanding of 
what ought to be. So, on this characterization, the ultimate task of reason is to achieve a systematic 
understanding of both what is and what ought to be.43 
 
Turning to the third of these characterizations of reason, one of Kant’s deepest insights is that this 
second way of characterizing reason is ultimately equivalent to our third. There is a great to say 
about this connection, but again the basic idea is simple enough. In particular, on Kant’s conception 
of autonomy, for reason to be autonomous is just for its activities to be determined only by reason’s 
own a priori principles. So, for example, the activity of practical reason will be autonomous just in 
                                               
40 See (e.g.) A633/B661. 
41 See (e.g.) Bix-x. 
42 Compare Engstrom(2009). Of course, the idea that practical reason is cognitive in this sense is not uncontroversial. 
For example, contrast Neiman(1994) on this point.  
43 This focus on comprehension/understanding as the ultimate cognitive aim of reason marks one important difference 
between my interpretation and Engstrom’s. 
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case this activity is an (absolute or unqualified) instance of practical cognition from principles. And, as just 
laid out, practical cognition from principles is just practical comprehension. So, to say that reason’s 
telos lies in autonomy is equivalent to saying that it lies in comprehension. 
 
In this way, it is not too difficult to see why Kant would regard these three characterizations of 
reason as equivalent to one another. And given this, Reason-First Constitutivism can be made more 
precise in either of the following ways: 
 
Understanding-First Constitutivism: The most fundamental norms that apply to us are 
grounded in our nature as rational beings or creatures with the capacity for (theoretical and practical) 
understanding. 
 
Autonomy-First Constitutivism: The most fundamental norms that apply to us are 
grounded in our nature as rational beings or creatures with the capacity for autonomy. 
 
One of the strengths of the Kant’s approach to constitutivism, and of the conception of reason 
which sits at its heart, is the manner in which it brings together these two characterizations of the 
core of constitutivism. This, of course, is also significant for the relationship between between 
Reason-First Constitutivism and Agency-First Constitutivism in their most Kantian forms. For, of 
course, the most Kantian forms of Agency-First Constitutivism conceive of agency precisely as the 
capacity for autonomy. As a result, in their most Kantian forms, Agency-First Constitutivism and 
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